










































































The Internet is expanding rapidly into every market and many geographic locations. While
much attention focuses on so-called “new economy” businesses,an interesting aspect of the
Internet revolution is the change being forced on traditional industries. The resulting threat
to intermediaries such as traditional brokerage and music labels were not hard to predict,
however,the impact of the Internet on some other industries was less clear. In 1995,for
example,the popular press devoted much discussion to predicting the products for which the
Internet would be a good sales channel. Cars were often considered to be a poor ﬁt. After
all,went the argument,consumers would always want to “kick the tires” before buying a car.
While consumers remain interested in physically inspecting a car,the Internet has nonetheless
become an important complement to the car-buying process. In 1999,for example,25% of all
consumers who were in the market for a new car used the Internet in conjunction with buying
a car (J.D. Power and Associates,1999).
This paper investigates web-based auto retailing to understand whether the Internet has
changed the product market behavior of established ﬁrms. In particular we investigate how
much and in what ways Internet car referral services aﬀect dealer pricing of automobiles in
California.
Internet car referral services are one of three types of sites related to new car purchases;
the other two types are informational sites and sites that oﬀer cars at posted prices. At the
core of both informational and referral sites is detailed information about individual cars,
including current market conditions and invoice pricing. While informational sites are only
indirectly involved in the car purchase,referral sites such as Autobytel.com,Autoweb.com,
and Carpoint.com establish contractual relations with dealers and pass on consumers’ purchase
requests or “qualiﬁed leads” to contract dealers. Recently,sites have started operating that
oﬀer cars at posted prices (although the actual sale is still performed through an aﬃliated
dealership). These services are still in their infancy.
In this paper we capitalize on the fact that Internet purchase referral services do not control
the prices oﬀered by the dealer. This means that prices that are oﬀered to consumers continue
to be the choice variable of dealers,whether a consumer walked into the showroom or was
referred by an Internet service. The referring Internet services do not systematically learn
transaction prices. To date it has not been possible,except through self-reported surveys,to
assess what impact Internet referral services have on prices. The ﬁrst question we answer in
this paper is whether consumers who use Internet purchase referral services to buy a car pay
less for an equivalent car than consumers who do not. Analyzing purchase referral data from
Autobytel.com in combination with transaction data from J.D. Powers and Associates (JDPA),
2the answer is yes. Conditional on the car,consumers that submitted a purchase request pay
on average $451 less than an oﬄine customer. Of these savings $72 stem from the fact that
Autobytel.com steers consumers to low-price dealerships. Conditioning on the dealership (in
addition to the car),online consumers pay another $379 less than oﬄine customer. We also ﬁnd
that the level of price dispersion at a dealer declines in the dealer’s Autobytel.com business.
This indicates that the lower prices we ﬁnd are not entirely driven by the selection eﬀect (good
bargainers move online). The combination of results and the fact that referral services save
consumers time seem to validate Autobytel.com’s value proposition to consumers (and perhaps
that of other referral services) and may explain why referral service usage has grown rapidly.
Secondly,we examine the level of dealer proﬁts from the vehicle and from other products
and services sold using the web. Dealer margins (price less invoice cost) on the sale of a
vehicle through Autobytel.com are signiﬁcantly lower than margins earned selling the vehicle
the traditional way; prices are lower and the costs of acquiring the vehicle from manufacturers
are not. In addition,proﬁts from ancillary products like ﬁnancing and service contracts are
also lower (by about $160) when the customer arrives via the web. Because online customers
are substantially cheaper to serve,however,the dealer is likely to be better oﬀ working with
Autobytel.com.1 To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study of the eﬀect of Internet purchase
referral services on car pricing using transaction data. This paper contributes to a small body
of empirical literature analyzing the eﬀect of the Internet on ﬁrms’ product market behavior
(Brown & Goolsbee,2000; Brynjolfsson & Smith,1999; Carlton & Chevalier,2000; Clay,
Krishnan,& Wolﬀ,2000; Clemons,Hann,& Hitt,1999; Lucking-Reiley,1999; Iyer & Pazgal,
2000). There are a number of papers that analyze automobile pricing (Ayres & Siegelman,
1995; Berry,Levinsohn,& Pakes,1995; Goldberg,1995,1996; Pashigian,Bowen,& Gould,
1995; Verboven,1999). Goldberg (1995) and Berry et al. (1995) estimate structural models
of demand for automobiles. Pashigian et al. (1995) investigates within-season pricing patterns
for automobiles,and Verboven (1999) tries to determine whether pricing practices on base
cars diﬀer from those of cars with options. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) and Goldberg (1996)
analyze race and gender discrimination by car dealers. Our paper is closest to these in that
we are explicitly interested in the diﬀerential pricing introduced by dealerships. However,in
contrast to all previous studies,our focus is on the Internet and how it aﬀects the level and
distribution of auto prices.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes Internet car retailing. Section 3 discusses some
of the eﬀects that the Internet may have on car pricing. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
presents the results,and section 6 concludes the paper.
1Lehman Brothers, “Autobytel.com,” 5/12/1999
32 Internet car retailing
Informational sites do not have direct relationships with car dealers. Perhaps the best known
example of a for-proﬁt information site is edmunds.com,providing rich editorial content similar
to a car magazine (review,long term tests,etc.) supplemented with information on exact
options and invoice pricing for new and used vehicles. Sources of revenues are advertising,
detailed reports on vehicles,and commissions to other Internet sites such as the auto-loan site
peopleﬁrst.com,the insurance company geico.com,and referral sites such as Autobytel.com.
There also exist many non-proﬁt information sites typically run by “enthusiasts” that provide
information about vehicles,options,and dealers. A good example is audiworld.com.
Purchase referral sites were the ﬁrst Internet companies to contract directly with car dealers.
They try to capitalize on the large dissatisfaction of consumers with the car buying process
by shielding consumers as much as possible from direct interaction with dealers and “arming”
them with information.2 In light of the regulatory constraints in all US states that give dealers
the exclusive right to sell cars to consumers,Autoweb.com,Autobytel.com,and Carpoint.com
(to name some of the largest sites) focus on referring consumers to car dealers with which they
have contracted.3 Autobytel.com,the ﬁrst of these sites,has been in operation since March
of 1995. Referral sites oﬀer consumers detailed information about individual cars,including
current market conditions and invoice pricing as well as editorial content.
At any given point a consumer may submit a free purchase request in which the consumer
speciﬁes which car she is interested in (including options and color),within which time frame
she intends to purchase,and where she can be reached. While there are some small diﬀerences
between referral sites,these purchase requests are generally e-mailed to a salesperson within a
dealership who is assigned exclusively to responding to Internet purchase requests. Consumers
are typically called back or e-mailed within 24-48 hours with a (supposedly) ﬁxed price.4 They
can buy the car,if they wish to do so,without setting foot in the dealership until they pick
up the car. The referral service sends an e-mail to the customer a few days after the referral
asking whether she has been contacted by the dealer. Two weeks later another survey is sent to
consumers,inquiring whether a car has been purchased and whether the consumer was satisﬁed
with the dealership.
Referral sites send submitted referrals to dealers with whom they have contracted. Out
of the approximately 22000 dealers in the US as of 2000,Carpoint.com,for example,had
2For a description of the car buying process see “Disintermediation in the US Auto Industry,” Stanford GSB
Case Study EC10
3Recently Autobytel.com has started selling directly to consumers and Autoweb.com has partnered with
CarsDirect, a direct sales site.
4Note that the price oﬀer from the dealer (by phone or email) is not a binding commitment.
43,700 dealers under contract, and Autoweb.com and Autobytel.com each contracted with 5,000
dealerships.5 Dealers either pay an annual ﬁxed fee based on the size of the dealership (between
$500 and $7500 for Autobytel.com) or a combination of annual fee and a per referral charge
($500-$1000 annual fee and $29 per referral for Autoweb).6 In exchange,dealers are assigned
exclusive or semi-exclusive territories such that customers in a speciﬁed geographic area that
submit a purchase referral for a speciﬁc car get referred to one dealer only (or two dealers in the
case of semi exclusivity). The contract usually also speciﬁes that the sales person who responds
to requests by the referral service does not sell to walk-in customers. This dedicated “Internet
sales person” is usually trained directly by the referral service. In addition,dealerships are
usually required to compensate this sales person by units sold,not as a percentage of car proﬁt.
These rules are intended to ensure that consumers receive a “no-haggle” price. Dealerships are
encouraged to give referral consumers the lowest ﬁnal price they would normally give a consumer
on the sales ﬂoor. Purchase referral sites cannot monitor dealer performance directly. Instead
they rely on customer satisfaction surveys and on their estimates of “conversion rates,” i.e.
how many referrals are sent to the dealer per sale made. Conversion rates are about 4 leads to
1 sale. If conversion rate numbers are low for a dealership,or many consumers complain about
the dealership,a referral site will terminate the contract with the dealer. Autobytel.com,for
example,terminated over 250 dealers between 1995 and 1999. 7
Recently,some Internet sites have started oﬀering cars at posted prices to consumers. The
most prominent ones are CarsDirect.com and Greenlight.com. CarsDirect is an online broker
that has contracts with 1700 dealerships nationwide. A consumers buys a vehicle at a ﬁxed
price on CarsDirect’s site but still interacts with the dealer to sign the papers. Greenlight is
founded by the Ashbury automotive group,a large owner of dealerships and and sells consumers
cars owned by its dealerships.
3 Hypotheses
The Internet can be expected to have a strong eﬀect on car retailing because many — if not
most — customers actively dislike contact with car dealerships and particularly salespeople.
This stands in contrast to some other industries such as brokerage,where customers might like,
or at least feel neutral about,their broker. Consequently,online auto referral services advertise
both their convenience and their ability to get low prices for consumers.
5Carpoint.com website, Autoweb.com Website, Autobytel.com interview
6Youngme Moon (1999), “Autobytel.com,” HBS Case Study
7See Lehman Brothers, “Autobytel.com,” 5/12/1999 for information about conversion rates and dealer
turnover.
5Consumers may gain from shopping online even if Internet referral services do not cause
dealers to oﬀer diﬀerent prices to online and oﬄine consumers. This is because referral services
may simply sign up the lowest-cost/lowest-price dealers in each region. In this way a consumer
gains by using the service because she does not have to search for the cheapest dealership in
her area. In such a world,the Internet is causing mean prices to decline by reducing search
costs.
The contract between the Internet referral service and the dealer contains incentives that
may cause the dealer to oﬀer referred customers low prices. An Autobytel.com dealer pays a
yearly fee for the stream of leads and may decide whether and how to convert each lead into
a sale. However,the referral service expects a substantial proportion of leads to result in sale,
since this is the best way to keep customers happy.8 If the percentage “closed” (sales/leads) is
too low,the dealer may be terminated by the Internet referral service and replaced by another
dealer in that area. Provided the stream of customers generated by the Internet referral service
is valuable to the dealership,it has an incentive to quote low prices to keep its “close” percentage
up. In a sense,the referral service is bargaining on behalf of a group of consumers,although
that group is not yet formed. This bargaining feature of the referral service is one we expect
to lead to lower prices for consumers who use the service.
However,referral services also must attract and partner with dealers,who would not partic-
ipate if their outside option were better. It may be that dealers participate to gain incremental
sales or to prevent incremental sales by a competing dealer that may otherwise sign up with
the referral service. It is also possible,however,that lower-priced Internet sales may be as prof-
itable as conventional sales,depending on the dealership’s cost structure. Online buyers are
low cost because they have searched already (test-driving at some other dealership perhaps),
have decided what car they want,and are ready to buy. Therefore the dealer may be able to
spend very little time selling and little time haggling. Any incremental sales (business stealing)
may also create economies of scale for a dealership. Thus,dealers are put in contact with a
large volume of low-cost consumers and expected to oﬀer price reductions.
There are two arguments why consumers who use referral services may pay more than
other consumers. First,Internet purchase referral services are convenient because they allow a
consumer to engage in the car purchase process any time of day or night without leaving her
home. In addition,referral services shield consumers to some extent from direct interaction
with dealers. To the extent that consumers with a high utility for convenience are less price
sensitive,we should expect that dealers charge referral customers a higher price — not lower
prices as claimed by Internet referral services. Second,the Internet may attract those consumers
8This determination is made on the basis of customer satisfaction surveys.
6who are bad bargainers because it allows them to avoid face-to-face negotiations. We would
expect dealers to recognize this in the long run and thus price higher for referred customers.
Overall,however,we expect bargaining on behalf of consumers and the lower cost of selling to
outweigh the potential eﬀect of convenience and negotiation avoidance.
Therefore,we hypothesize the following:
• Dealerships that contract with an Internet referral service have lower oﬄine prices than
other dealerships.
• Consumers who submit a purchase request pay a lower price than other consumers at
that dealership.
The referred customers may also face lower search cost in obtaining detailed information
about current market conditions and invoice pricing from the referral site and other web sites.
They may therefore be well informed about what the price of their preferred car ought to
be. Dealers will have a harder time selling to this group with an unreasonably high price.
If these consumers were previously uninformed (and perhaps paying an unreasonably high
price),we expect to see the high end of the distribution of prices moving toward the mean as
Autobytel.com sales rise.
It is important to note that it is possible that the referral site has no eﬀect on the price
a particular consumer receives,despite average on-line prices being lower than average oﬀ-
line prices. Suppose that all the educated people received low prices before the Internet was
invented because they read Consumer Reports and were good at bargaining. Now all the
educated consumers use the Internet to obtain price information and to conduct bargaining
over the purchase. The same customers continue to get lower prices than average,but because
they disproportionately use the Internet,Internet prices are lower than average. In this case
Autobytel.com prices will be lower than average,but the cause of the lower prices would
be unclear. If this story were true,the distribution of prices would remain unchanged with
the introduction of the Internet. Our conjecture above,that the Internet informs previously
uninformed customers,implies that price dispersion will decline with Internet use if these
consumers move from the far right of the price distribution toward the mean.
• The dispersion of prices within a dealership will decline with the amount of Internet
(informed) customers.
In addition,we also explore how the price a consumer pays varies if that consumer uses the
Internet referral service but then purchases from another dealer,as compared to purchasing
from the dealer to whom she was referred. Normally,we would expect a consumer to abandon
7one product choice in favor of another because it featured a lower price or higher quality. The
same holds in this market. Consumers may search further with their Internet referral quote
to extract more price concessions from other dealers. In this case,consumers who leave their
referred dealer should pay a lower price than those who stay. However,a consumers may also
leave the referred dealer because the competing dealer oﬀers better quality: for example,a
location near the customer’s home or work. For these customers we should see transaction
prices that are the same or higher in comparison with the prices of those who did not leave the
referred dealer.
• If consumers who submit a purchase request and switch away from their referred dealer
do so to obtain higher quality (lower prices),transaction prices of these consumers will
be higher (lower) than those of consumers who purchase from the referred dealer.
This hypothesis also speaks to the convenience aspect of referral services. We do not expect
this hypothesis to hold if many consumers use Internet referral services for convenience and
dealerships price accordingly. Then,those consumers that are willing to spend time searching
for a low price should ﬁnd a better price by switching to a dealership other than the one to
whom they were referred.
4 Data
Our data come from two sources. The ﬁrst is a major online car referral service,Autobytel.com. 9
We have obtained the purchase requests submitted by consumers on Autobytel.com during 1999,
yielding slightly over 2 million observations. An observation consists of customer information,
desired car,the date the request was made,the dealer to whom Autobytel.com sent the referral,
and the time frame within which the consumer is interested in buying the vehicle.
The second dataset we employ comes from J.D. Power and Associates (JDPA). JDPA
collects transaction data from a sample of dealers in the major metropolitan areas in the US.
We have data from California dealerships,containing every new car transaction at a sample of
1101 dealerships from January 1,1999 to February 28,2000. We take the extra two months
of JDPA data to allow for referrals in late 1999 that result in a purchase in early 2000. Each
observation in the JDPA data contains customer information,the make,model and trim level
9Autobytel.com had between 45 and 50% market share of online car shopping in 1999 (LA Times, 3/28/2000,
“Mergers and Acquisitions Report,” Securities Data Publishing 6/12/2000). According to February 2000 survey
by Greenﬁeld Online, Autobytel.com is the most visited Automobile site to research for a new car. It is visited
by 25% of consumers that researched online to shop for a car, followed by ford.com (24%), gm.com (16%),
toyota.com (14%), autoweb.com (12%), honda.com (12%), autovantage.com (12%), chryslercorp.com (11%),
cars.com (11%), and autotrader.com (10%).
8of the car,ﬁnancing,trade-in information,dealer-added extras,and the proﬁtability of the car
and the customer to the dealership.10
We consider a match between observations from Autobytel.com and JDPA when both the
address and the name associated with the referral and the purchase transaction are identical.
Thus,our matching is conservative. For example,if the purchase referral was submitted by a
family member with a diﬀerent name from the person who purchased the car,we would not
consider the observations to match,even if they live at the same address. Each observation in
the new dataset is a transaction from the JDPA data,augmented with the information from the
Autobytel.com data if there was a match. Hence,customers who get an Autobytel.com referral
but subsequently do not purchase will not be in the combined dataset. We are not interested in
these customers as there is no observable transaction. If the customer purchases a car,but not
from a dealership in the JDPA sample,she will not be in our dataset either. This information
is lost,but as we have no prices from Autobytel.com and no comparison data from JDPA,there
is no analysis that can be done with this group. Finally,there are online referral services other
than Autobytel.com. The customers in the combined dataset who are not identiﬁed as using
Autobytel.com may have used one of their competitors. This strengthens our test since we will
be comparing a group that used Autobytel.com to a group that may include users of competing
services.
The combined dataset contains 360255 vehicle purchases between January 1,1999 and
February 28,2000. There are 10288 customers in this dataset who submitted a purchase request
in 1999 through Autobytel.com (2.9% of all transactions). The new variables created after the
match between datasets are (1) an indicator for Autobytel.com customer (ABT) indicating
that the customer who purchased the car submitted a purchase request using Autobytel.com
(irrespective of whether this purchase request went to the dealer that sold the car),(2) an
indicator for Autobytel.com franchise dealer (ABTFranchise) indicating that the dealer who
sold the car is an Autobytel.com aﬃliated dealer,i.e. is under contract with Autobytel.com and
receives purchase requests,(3) an indicator for same dealer ( SameDealer) marking cases when
the dealer that sold the car is the same dealer to whom the purchase request was submitted
(given that ABT=1).
4.1 Car deﬁnition and selection
Since consumers who use Autobytel.com may prefer diﬀerent cars than those who do not,
it is very important to control for the exact car that was purchased. We deﬁne a “car” as
10The dealer can sell the customer extras like service contracts and life insurance that make car and customer
proﬁts diﬀerent.
9Car segment Obs. % Examples Final Obs.
Compact 52512 14.6 Honda Civic,Toyota Corolla 34794
Large 839 0.2 Ford Crown Victoria,Chevrolet Impala 0
Luxury 40203 11.2 BMW 323i,Lexus GS400,Volvo S80 16743
Midsize 72726 20.2 Honda Accord,Toyota Camry,Oldsmobile Cutlass 45075
Pickup 61458 17.1 Ford F150,GMC Sierra 1500,Toyota Tundra 27064
SUV 78172 21.7 Jeep Cherokee,Ford Explorer,Lexus RX300 44482
Sporty 21965 6.1 BMW Z3,Honda Prelude,Mitsubishi Eclipse 8485
Van 32380 9.0 Dodge Caravan,Ford Club Wagon,Ford Windstar 19129
every combination of make and model (e.g. Honda Accord,Toyota Camry), body type (e.g.
convertible,coupe,hatchback,sport utility), doors (e.g. 2 door,4 door,4D Ext Cab), trim level
(for Honda Accord,e.g. DX,EX,LX etc.), drive train type (e.g. 2WD,4WD), transmission type
(automatic,manual), cylinders (e.g. 4 Cyl,6 Cyl), displacement (e.g. 3.0 liters,3.3 liters),
and model year (e.g. 1999,2000). 11 This results in many diﬀerent “cars,” some of which
comprise very few observations. We drop cars for which there are fewer than 500 observations,
unless that car has has more than 1.5% share of its segment (as deﬁned by JDPA). In addition,
because there are so few units sold,we drop the “Large” segment.
Although we have a great deal of information about the car purchased,we do not know
what options have been purchased unless they are represented by the trim level. While the
trim level captures most options,we do not observe exact dealer and factory-installed options
(a CD player for example). The prices we observe,however,will reﬂect all options. We believe
that the bias generated by this omitted variable will make our test stronger. People using the
Internet are on average more educated and more aﬄuent than those not using the Internet.
Therefore,we would expect them to purchase unobservably fancier cars than the average buyer.
If this eﬀect is strong,we will ﬁnd a “buying online” indicator predicts higher prices,not lower
ones.
Removing “cars” with a small number of observations reduces the sample size by 46% to
195772. The dataset now contains 204 diﬀerent “cars” sold through 810 dealers.
4.2 Dependent variables
There are many diﬀerent ways of deﬁning the price of a vehicle,for example one can take into
account the proﬁt/loss from a trade-in,dealer installed accessories,or manufacturer rebates.
1146.5% of the cars in the full dataset have a transmission coded as ‘N/A’ rather than automatic or manual.
Most cars have observations in all three groups or in just automatic and N/A. We treat the N/A group as
another type of transmission, since it is likely to be composed of both automatic and standard shift cars, but
we cannot tell in what mix.
10For our main speciﬁcation we deﬁne Price as the price that the customer pays for the vehicle,
factory installed accessories and options,and dealer-installed accessories contracted for at the
time of sale,subject to two adjustments. First,we subtract the ManufacturerRebate given
given directly to the consumer,if any,since this is simply cash that reduces the price of the car
to the customer. Secondly,we subtract what is known as the TradeInOverAllowance. This is
the diﬀerence between the trade-in price paid by the dealer to the consumer and the estimated
cash value of the trade-in vehicle (as booked by the dealer). This is the negative of the dealer’s
projected proﬁt on the trade-in vehicle. We adjust for this amount to account for the fact that
dealers may oﬀer consumers,for example,a low price for the new car because they are making
a proﬁt oﬀ the trade-in. Table 4.2 shows an example where consumers A and B are contracting
with the dealer for a diﬀerent new car price but end up paying the same Price according to
our deﬁnition.
Consumer A Consumer B
Contract price of new vehicle 21,000 19,000
Actual cash value of trade-in 9,000 9,000
Trade-in vehicle price 10,000 8,000
TradeInOverAllowance 1,000 -1,000
Price 20,000 20,000
All factory and dealer accessories that contribute to the resale value of the car are contained
in Price; so called “after market options (AMOs)” such as rustprooﬁng or wax are not included,
nor are service contracts and other sources of income for the dealer.
The VehicleCost is the retailer’s ‘net’ cost for the vehicle and includes the cost of accessories
added by the factory and/or retailer and included in the customer’s contract that add to the
vehicle’s book value. The measure takes into account holdback and includes transportation
charges.12
We deﬁne VehicleProﬁt as the dollar proﬁt that the dealer makes on the vehicle,factory
installed accessories and options,and dealer-installed accessories contracted for at the time of
sale. Hence, VehicleProﬁt = Price−VehicleCost+ManufacturerRebate. We add manufacturer
rebate since it goes directly from the manufacturer to the consumer. We also use TotalProﬁt
which adds proﬁts from ﬁnancing,service contracts,and credit insurance.
12“Holdback” is the trade’s term for additional proﬁt to the dealer built in to the invoice for the car, but not
itemized as such on the invoice. If a dealer sells a car at his invoice price, his proﬁt on the car will equal the
holdback amount on the car.
114.3 Controls
To control for time variation in prices we deﬁne a dummy EndOfMonth that equals 1 if the
car was sold within the last 5 days of the month. Dealers who want to meet volume targets
for the month often have sales or other inducements to purchase near the end of the month. A
dummy variable Weekend speciﬁes whether the car was purchased on a Saturday or Sunday for
the same reason. In addition,we introduce dummies for each month in the 14 month sample
period to control for other seasonal eﬀects and inﬂation.
We control for the number of months between when a car was sold and its introduction.
This proxies for how “hot” a car is and what the opportunity cost of not selling it is for the
dealer. Judging by the distribution of sales after car introductions we distinguish between sales
in the ﬁrst four months,months 5-13,and month 14 and later and assign a dummy variable to
each category.
Finally,we also control for the region in which the car was sold according to the deﬁnition
of a region by JDPA as “Northern California” and “Southern California.”
5 Results
We will ﬁrst describe who uses Autobytel.com and how their behavior diﬀers from others. Next
we analyze whether use of Autobytel.com alters the average price a consumer expects to pay
for her car using hedonic regressions. We end with a discussion of trade-ins,dealer proﬁts,and
dealer costs.
5.1 Unconditional diﬀerences across customers and dealers
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the entire dataset. Three percent of customers submit-
ted a purchase request through Autobytel.com on average. There is variation in this percentage
across segments in the data (see tables 9 to 15 starting on page 28 in the appendix). For ex-
ample,less than one percent of pickup purchases but almost ﬁve percent of van purchases used
the service. Twenty-eight percent of purchase requests resulted in a sale at the referred dealer,
although this also varies by segment. The luxury and van segments have lower close rates,
while pickup and SUV segments have higher rates. Thirty-three percent of transactions went
through dealerships who are signed up with Autobytel.com. The average car in the sample sold
for $23,580 and earned the dealer almost $1700 in gross proﬁt. Most segments (van, sporty,
SUV) earned close to $2000 proﬁt,while luxury cars earned more and compact and mid-sized
cars earned less ($1000) for the dealer. The price including aftermarket options,documen-
tary preparation charge,service contract premium,license,title,registration,and sales taxes
12is the TotalPrice listed in the table. It is three thousand dollars more than the vehicle price.
Most customers ﬁnance their car through the dealer: about 75% in our sample. The average
amount ﬁnanced,conditional on any ﬁnancing is $22, 350,corresponding to 83% of TotalPrice.
The average proﬁt earned by the dealer on ﬁnancing is $312. The average vehicle stayed on
a dealer’s lot for 40 days before being sold. There is not enough diﬀerence between Northern
and Southern California to report the data separately,except that Southern Californians are
more likely to purchase from their referred dealer (32% vs. 26%).
Table 1: Summary statistics (all segments)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 195,772 0.032 0.175 0 1
ABTFranchise 195,772 0.331 0.470 0 1
SameDealer 195,772 0.009 0.094 0 1
Price 195,772 23,580.4 8,848.9 5,946 106,370
TotalPrice 195,772 26,611.6 9,849.6 6,856 118,284
TradeInOverAllowance 56,174 769.3 1,782.3 -9,980 18,500
VehicleProﬁt 187,810 1,689.9 1,398.0 -4,894 13,384
TotalProﬁt 185,224 2,109.2 1637.2 -1,425 16,853
VehicleCost 187,810 22,299.3 7,879.0 7,351 93,584
DaysToTurn 188,758 39.9 53.0 1 642
EndOfMonth 195,772 0.211 0.408 0 1
Weekend 195,772 0.327 0.469 0 1
Female 161,396 0.340 0.474 0 1
AnyFinancing 195772 0.759 0.427 0 1
AmountFinanced 148,713 22,350.4 9,018.5 500 10,6431
FinancingProﬁt 145,962 312.0 600.9 0 9,758
We expect to see a diﬀerence between customers who use Autobytel.com and those who don’t
if Autobytel.com users have higher incomes or education levels and therefore behave diﬀerently
and buy diﬀerent kinds of cars. Table 2 contains means and medians for a subset of variables
according to whether the customer used Autobytel.com or not. Median price is higher for
the ABT customers ($1,172), as we expected (since we are not conditioning on car type in any
way). Mean proﬁts on the vehicle earned by the dealers are very similar between the two groups;
however,unconditional median proﬁts are $169 higher for non-ABT customers. TotalProﬁt on
the customer is also signiﬁcantly lower for Autobytel.com customers. Perhaps because they
are less aﬄuent or less ﬁnancially sophisticated,76% of non-ABT customers obtain ﬁnancing
from the dealer,while only 64% of ABT customers do so. The amount customers ﬁnance,
conditional on obtaining ﬁnancing,is slightly higher for non-ABT customers. Other notable
diﬀerences between the two groups are in DaysToTurn,which is very low for Autobytel.com
customers. This reﬂects the practice of re-setting the “clock” to zero when the car changes
dealerships. A car that is obtained from another dealership especially for an online customer
13Table 2: Transaction summary statistics by Autobytel.com use
ABT=0 Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Price 189,594 23,576.6 22,264 8,903.3 5,946 106,370
TotalPrice 189,594 26,615.9 25,138 9,910.1 6,856 118,284
TradeInOverAllowance 54,999 781.2 0 1,790.7 -9,980 18,500
VehicleProﬁt 181,820 1,692.0 1,422 1,398.9 -4,894 13,384
TotalProﬁt 179,279 2,117.2 1,773 1,641.4 -1,425 16,853
VehicleCost 181,820 22,299.4 21,161.5 7,928.3 7,351 93,584
DaysToTurn 182,840 40.3 20 53.1 1 642
EndOfMonth 189,594 0.210 0 0.408 0 1
Weekend 189,594 0.328 0 0.470 0 1
Female 156,319 .341 0 .474 0 1
AnyFinancing 189,594 0.764 1 0.425 0 1
AmountFinanced 144,791 22,383.5 20,948 9,050.4 500 106,431
FinancingProﬁt 142,086 314.4 78 604.3 0 9,758
ABT=1 Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Price 6,178 23,696.3 23,436 6,972.2 6,995 83,890
TotalPrice 6,178 26,476.7 26,062.5 7,765.6 7,961 96,148
TradeInOverAllowance 1,175 215.3 0 1,209.0 -4,600 13,500
VehicleProﬁt 5,990 1,627.0 1,253.5 1,370.2 -1,964 10,979
TotalProﬁt 5,945 1,868.6 1,482 1,483.9 -974 14,863
VehicleCost 5,990 22,296.0 21,812.5 6,196.6 8,882 76,515
DaysToTurn 5,918 28.6 11 45.7 1 479
EndOfMonth 6,178 0.236 0 0.425 0 1
Weekend 6,178 0.304 0 0.460 0 1
Female 5,077 0.312 0 0.463 0 1
AnyFinancing 6,178 0.635 1 0.482 0 1
AmountFinanced 3,922 21130.0 20,085 7,648.8 2,407 87,163
FinancingProﬁt 3,876 222.1 67.5 448.4 0 7,425
will sit on its new lot a very short time. TradeInOverAllowance is lower for the ABT group,
which is something we will discuss in detail later in the paper.
Eighteen percent of ABT customers buy insurance or a repair contract from the dealer,as
compared to 29% of the rest of the sample. Table 3 contains demographics according to whether
the customer used Autobytel.com or not. These are census data from the block where the
customer lives. Unfortunately,we do not have individual buyer demographics. Autobytel.com
customers come from census blocks that are more male,more professional,and higher educated.
Average income in these census blocks is $67,000 rather than $58,000 for the non-Autobytel.com
group. Census blocks with Autobytel.com customers also have fewer farm workers and fewer
African-American residents.
ABT franchise dealers are also diﬀerent from non-ABT franchise dealers as shown in Table 4.
They are much larger: on average they sell 767 cars during our time period as compared to 346
for non-ABT franchise dealers. ABTFranchise dealers sell about 3.6% of their cars through
Autobytel.com. Non-ABTFranchise dealers pick up some ABT customers who switch dealers;
14Table 3: Demographics by Autobytel.com use
ABT=0 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 156,319 0.341 0.474 0 1
%Professional 186,630 16.4 8.8 0 100
%Farmer 186,630 2.6 5.8 0 100
MedianHHIncome 185,891 58,348.4 25,551.2 10,500 150,000
MedianAgeHeadHH 185,891 45.2 6.7 13 70
%CollegeGrad 185,995 31.5 17.4 0 100
%<HighSchool 185,995 13.2 12.6 0 100
%Black 186,002 4.4 10.0 0 100
ABT=1 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 5,077 0.312 0.463 0 1
%Professional 6,113 19.5 8.9 0 66
%Farmer 6,113 1.6 3.7 0 59
MedianHHIncome 6,094 66,824.0 26,067.6 13,188 150,000
MedianAgeHeadHH 6,094 45.1 6.6 18 70
%CollegeGrad 6,098 39.2 17.1 0 95
%<HighSchool 6,098 8.9 8.6 0 87
%Black 6,098 3.2 6.4 0 99
their percentage is lower at 1.5%. Close to seventy percent of customers ﬁnance at both types
of dealers. ABTFranchise dealers accept slightly fewer trade-ins and turn around their cars
four days quicker than non-ABTFranchise dealers. The appendix compares demographics and
further summary statistics by ABTFranchise (Tables 16 and 17 on page 31).
Table 4: Dealer summary statistics by ABTFranchise
ABTFranchise=0 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
DealerVolume 667 346 542 1 4280
DealerSales 667 7766418 12200000 8550 105000000
Dealer%ABT 667 0.015 0.023 0 0.25
Dealer%Financed 650 0.695 0.189 0.050 1
Dealer%TradeIn 585 0.337 0.161 0.015 1
Dealer%SameDealer 667 0 0 0 0
ABTFranchise=1 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
DealerVolume 143 767 825 11 4496
DealerSales 143 18700000 20700000 193917 149000000
Dealer%ABT 143 0.036 0.030 0 0.139
Dealer%Financed 143 0.682 0.155 0.272 0.967
Dealer%TradeIn 143 0.264 0.100 0.039 0.513
Dealer%SameDealer 143 0.022 0.027 0 0.131
5.2 Conditional Prices
As discussed above,our primary interest is whether use of Autobytel.com alters the average
price a consumer expects to pay for her car. The dependent variable we use is Price as deﬁned
15above. In order to provide the appropriate baseline for the price of the car,we use a standard
hedonic regression on log price. We work in logs because many of the attributes of the car,such
as being sold in Northern California or in December,are not appropriate to model as a ﬁxed
dollar increment,but will be a percentage of the car’s value. Our explanatory variables are “car”
dummies (which are make * model * body type * doors * drive train * trim * transmission *
cylinders * displacement * model year),month dummies,an indicator for southern California,
and indicators for whether the car was sold on a weekend or at the end of the month. An OLS
regression of log price on only these controls (not reported) results in an adjusted R-squared
of .94. Such a high R-squared is an indication that the options we cannot measure are not a
large part of the variation in car prices.
Table 5 on page 17 shows the results when we include an ABT indicator in the regression.
Its coeﬃcient is -.016 and it is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at below the 1% level. This
means a typical ABT consumer pays 1.6% less for her car,a savings of $379 for the average
car purchased by this group. In another regression (not reported) we include ﬁxed eﬀects
for each dealer and the ABT indicator. In this speciﬁcation the coeﬃcient on ABT drops to
negative 1.2%,which is a savings of $284 on the average ABT car. Again,these are conservative
estimates because the comparison group contains both “street” and Internet sales.
What do these estimates say about dealership’s proﬁtability? It depends crucially on both
how many of the Autobytel.com sales are incremental and the dealership’s costs of selling over
the Internet. If a dealer can use the low prices he oﬀers through Autobytel.com to capture share
from other dealers,the (possibly lower) margins on those cars are simply additional proﬁt,not
losses. In addition,the dealer may in fact earn a larger margin on his Autobytel.com sales
than his traditional sales due to the low costs of serving Internet consumers. We obtained
accounting data from one dealer in the midwest who breaks out his Internet sales separately.
We compared his costs (phone,computer,managerial time,oﬃce supplies,delivery charges,
etc.) to average dealer costs from the National Auto Dealers Association (NADA) and our
estimates.13 The diﬀerence between the average total cost of a traditional sale in our data
($1575) and his Autobytel.com average cost ($940) is over $600.14 Comparing this number to
our estimate of the expected price drop for Internet sales of between $300 and $500 provides one
reason for dealers to sign up with Autobytel.com: their margins may increase. This particular
dealership estimates that 60% of its Internet sales are incremental and 40% are cannibalization
of traditional sales. The net proﬁt per car sold through Autobytel.com at this dealership is
13We use the proﬁt margin from NADA of $198 and the JDPA median gross margin of $1773 to infer average
cost.
14Other estimates are higher. An analysts report states that “According to NADA numbers, the average new
car sales costs a dealer about $1,270 in personnel and marketing costs. The Autobytel.com service reduces these
costs by as much as $1,000.” Lehman Brothers, “Autobytel.com,” 5/12/1999
16Table 5: OLS of ln(price) on reported variables
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EndOfMonth -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0038
(0.00044) (0.00044) (0.00044)
Weekend -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0019
(0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038)
SouthernCal 0.0072 0.0074 0.0074
(0.00038) (0.00038) (0.00038)
Month2 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014
(0.00095) (0.00095) (0.00095)
Month3 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(0.00090) (0.00090) (0.00090)
Month4 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.00092) (0.00092) (0.00092)
Month5 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0030
(0.00090) (0.00090) (0.00090)
Month6 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.00093) (0.00093) (0.00093)
Month7 -0.0064 -0.0063 -0.0064
(0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00091)
Month8 -0.0103 -0.0102 -0.0102
(0.00093) (0.00093) (0.00093)
Month9 -0.0151 -0.0150 -0.0150
(0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113)
Month10 -0.0174 -0.0174 -0.0174
(0.00123) (0.00123) (0.00123)
Month11 -0.0229 -0.0229 -0.0229
(0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00131)
Month12 -0.0280 -0.0281 -0.0281
(0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00149)
Month13 -0.0265 -0.0266 -0.0266
(0.00160) (0.00160) (0.00160)
Month14 -0.0286 -0.0287 -0.0287
(0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00167)
ModelMonth5-13 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006
(0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00091)
ModelMonth14+ -0.0045 -0.0044 -0.0044
(0.00152) (0.00152) (0.00152)
Constant 10.0155 10.0167 10.0167
(0.00094) (0.00095) (0.00095)
CarDummies ... ... ...
Observations 195772 195772 195772
Adj. R
2 0.947 0.947 0.947
*All reported coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better except SameDealer,
months 2,4 and 6, and ModelMonth5-13
17$440,while the average net proﬁt per car sold in the traditional manner is $198 according to
NADA. Summing the “lost” margin from the traditional sales (at $198) and the additional
margin from Internet sales (at $440) leads to a net gain for this dealer of about thirty thousand
dollars from selling 89 cars per month over the Internet. However,we do not have an estimate of
the lost contribution to overhead from the traditional sales that now ﬂow through the Internet
division,nor do we have an estimate of rental costs for the Internet division. Any estimate
of these costs that falls under $889 will leave the dealership better oﬀ from its Internet sales.
Notice that while these calculations suggest that referral services are beneﬁcial to an aﬃliated
dealer,since many Internet sales seem to be incremental,non-aﬃliated dealerships are likely
to be worse oﬀ as a result of referral services.
The second column of Table 5 shows the coeﬃcients from our main speciﬁcation with ABT,
ABTFranchise,and SameDealer included. Purchasing a car from an Autobytel.com dealer
saves the purchaser .44% of the cost of the car,regardless of whether the customer ever went
online. Note,however,that the ABT coeﬃcient is unchanged. There are two explanations for
these results. One is that Autobytel.com chooses the lower-priced dealerships to partner with
and this is another beneﬁt users receive,or alternatively,lower-cost dealerships gain more from
partnering with Autobytel.com. The second reason might be that dealerships interested in the
web often sign up with more than one referral service. Thus the lower-than-average prices at
these dealerships may represent sales to all online customers. However,because Autobytel.com
had a large market share in 1999,one would expect the ABTFranchise coeﬃcient in a regression
by itself to be higher than when the ABT indicator is also included. However,the coeﬃcient
only diﬀers by .0002,hardly any change at all. This favors the selection explanations above.
Hence we will include the savings from being sent to an Autobytel.com dealer as part of the
customer’s total gain from the service. The combined savings from the two eﬀects is $483 per
Autobytel.com customer. Since the average customer has a 33% likelihood of shopping at an
Autobytel.com dealer at random (weighted by sales volume),the overall expected savings to
an average customer is $379 plus $72 (two-thirds of .0044 times average price),or $451.
SameDealer’s coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant,indicating consumers do not systematically gain
or lose by staying with the dealer referred to them by Autobytel.com. This result is likely due
to a mix of consumers who choose to leave their referral: some ﬁnd a better price elsewhere,
others accept a higher price from a better (e.g. more conveniently located) dealer.
Figure 1 represents the distribution of “bargaining outcomes” after we control for the char-
acteristics of the car and transaction in the regression. It is a histogram of the residuals from
our baseline speciﬁcation (controls and an ABT indicator) omitting the residuals of customers
who used Autobytel.com. The very small residuals represent oﬄine consumers who received







Figure 1: Histogram of residuals from Table 5 column 1 for ABT=0
coeﬃcients on ABT and ABTFranchise from Table 5 column 2 sum to -2.04%. A vertical
line at this point is drawn on the ﬁgure to show where the average Autobytel.com customer
appears in the “bargaining outcome” distribution. The ﬁgure shows that a consumer receiving
the mean Autobytel.com price does better than 61% of the customers who do not use the ser-
vice. The spike of customers near the mean Autobytel.com discount suggests that other online
purchases might be located around this level also. To the extent this is true,our calculation of
the advantage of online purchasing is conservative.
We also run our main speciﬁcation on each segment of the data separately,to see if the ABT
coeﬃcient is sensitive to the class of car being sold. The results are reported in Table 18 on
page 33 in the appendix. There is considerably variation across segment in the price discount
for online consumers. Consumers who purchase a pickup truck on the Internet pay 4% less
than oﬄine consumers. Both “sporty” and “compact” customers pay 2.4% less. In contrast,
the discount for luxury and van customers is below 1% and only signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
and the SUV discount is below average also. The anecdotal explanation for the “luxury” result
is that due to the economic boom in 1999,demand was outstripping the supply of these cars
so that no matter what channel a customer used,the price was not discounted signiﬁcantly. A
19similar story might hold for the SUV segment also.
We know the time frame the customer had in mind when at the Autobytel.com site: 48
hours,two weeks,or 30 days. We also know the number of days between submitting a purchase
request and the formal sale of the vehicle. (Coding the ﬁrst variable as 1,2,3 results in a
signiﬁcant correlation between them of 0.2.) If the Internet were primarily serving as a more
convenient method of purchasing,we might see higher prices for those consumers who are in a
hurry (time frame of 48hrs). If,instead,the consumers who use the Internet search,learn,and
make decisions in advance,then a short time frame indicates someone who knows exactly what
she wants. We include the buyer’s time frame lag in the price speciﬁcations above and report
the results in Table 5. We ﬁnd that people “ready to buy” save 0.5% of the value of the car on
top of the slightly smaller 1.4% saved by using Autobytel.com overall in this speciﬁcation. In
this speciﬁcation the total decrease in price on the average car by a ready-to-buy consumer at
an ABT dealer compared to a non-ABT dealer is $550.
The next set of results reports similar speciﬁcations on a measure of price that includes extra
charges a customer can pay such as service contract premia and aftermarket options (AMOs).
Aftermarket options are the fabric protectors and paint sealants that as JDPA politely states,
“do not add to the blue book value of the car.” We regress this Price w/ AMOs (logged) on the
same set of controls as well as ABT, ABTFranchise,and SameDealer. Our results,reported in
Table 6 on page 21,are very similar except that the ABT coeﬃcient and the ABTFranchise
coeﬃcient increase in magnitude (total 2.6%). We suspect that consumers who use the Internet
have better information about these high-margin products. Better information would lead a
consumer to back away from buying fabric protectant and service contracts. Although it could
be the case that educated customers choose to use Autobytel.com rather than the other way
around,we do know that the percentage of customers who buy either a service contract or an
aftermarket option or both is 10% higher for non-ABT customers.
5.3 Trade-in pricing, dealer proﬁts, and ﬁnancing
An interesting diﬀerence between Autobytel.com customers and others appears in the distri-
bution of proﬁts between the new vehicle and the trade-in. Autobytel.com customers make
less proﬁt on their trade-ins,although they end up better oﬀ overall. As reported in column
2 of Table 6,dealers oﬀer on average $350 less for an Autobytel.com customer’s old vehicle,
conditional on the value of the vehicle (this speciﬁcation does not contain car dummies,but
does contain dealer dummies). Dealers seem to compensate with higher new car prices for the
fact that they pay “too much” for trade-ins: an average of $770 above the “actual cash value”
20Table 6: Other dependent variables
log(Price w/ AMOs) TrOverAll. log(Price)










EndOfMonth -0.0041 -66.15 -0.0038
(0.00046) (17.57) (0.00044)
Weekend 0.0016 -78.95 -0.0020
(0.00040) (15.65) (0.00038)
SouthernCal 0.0047 (dropped) 0.0072
(0.00040) (0.00038)
Month2 0.0022 49.52 0.0014
(0.00099) (37.64) (0.00094)
Month3 0.0017 67.58 0.0004
(0.00094) (35.64) (0.00090)
Month4 0.0008 21.60 -0.0006
(0.00096) (36.31) (0.00092)
Month5 -0.0024 37.45 -0.0030
(0.00094) (35.56) (0.00090)
Month6 -0.0006 47.08 -0.0012
(0.00097) (36.48) (0.00092)
Month7 -0.0059 -41.83 -0.0064
(0.00095) (35.82) (0.00091)
Month8 -0.0093 -29.28 -0.0102
(0.00097) (36.12) (0.00093)
Month9 -0.0141 -31.88 -0.0150
(0.00118) (37.64) (0.00113)
Month10 -0.0169 -41.43 -0.0176
(0.00128) (38.50) (0.00123)
Month11 -0.0217 25.03 -0.0230
(0.00137) (40.18) (0.00131)
Month12 -0.0269 7.68 -0.0281
(0.00155) (41.27) (0.00149)
Month13 -0.0270 52.77 -0.0267
(0.00167) (42.00) (0.00160)










Observations 195765 56174 195772
Adj. R
2 0.941 0.120 0.947
*All reported coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better except SameDealer,
ABT*AnyTrade, some months, and the model month dummies.
21of the trade-in.15 Therefore,the average trade-in customer in our dataset sees an ABT contract
price that is about $800 less than non-ABT oﬄine prices,but receives about $350 less for her
trade-in,making the net savings about $450. It is also interesting to note that consumers who
trade in their old vehicles pay on average 0.7% more for their new vehicle than consumers that
have no trade-in (see the dummy AnyTrade in column 3 of Table 6). Recall that the dependent
variable price above is adjusted for the TradeInOverAllowance. The interaction coeﬃcient in
the table shows that the price premium that ABT customers pay when they trade in their old
car is no more or less than the premium paid by others whose transactions include trade-ins.
Since an online consumer is more likely to be comparing prices before the trade-in is discussed,
dealers may be unwilling to quote a high price for the new car in order to be able to subsidize
a trade-in later. However,it appears that a small overall price premium is charged to both
online and oﬄine consumers who trade in an old car.
Perhaps the most interesting dependent variable to study is the proﬁts the dealer earns on
the car and on the customer. Since we do not have data on a dealership’s overhead expenses,we
will analyze the gross margin rather than true proﬁts. We use a standard linear speciﬁcation
and measure margins in dollars. The results are reported in Table 7 columns 1 and 2 on
page 23. Column 1 lists the results of regressing the dealer’s gross margin on the vehicle
on our set of controls and the ABT indicator. Autobytel.com customers earn dealers $303
less per car,on average. This point estimate compares well to the $379 discount estimated
above. Evidence previously discussed suggests that these customers are cheaper to serve than
traditional customers,so they may be as proﬁtable to the dealership overall. Turning our
attention to the total proﬁt on the customer (ﬁnancing,service plans,insurance,etc. plus the
vehicle),we ﬁnd that ABT customers give the dealer $464 less in proﬁt. This complements the
results above,where we saw that ABT customers pay less for,or are less likely to buy,these
aftermarket items. This larger estimate also increases the dealer cost savings required to keep
sales to ABT customers proﬁtable.
Table 7 also shows that the cost of acquiring the vehicle is not diﬀerent between ABT
customers and non-ABT customers (column 4). In addition,ABT franchises face a slightly
higher cost of vehicles: $57 according to the coeﬃcient in the table. If Autobytel.com sales are
lower cost than conventional sales,this must be due to lower overhead costs such as salespeople’s
salaries and real estate rents.
Note that we are unable to discriminate between two diﬀerent interpretations of the above
results. If Autobytel.com or the Internet in general is helping to educate previously naive
15This is consistent with Goldberg (1996) who analyzes contract prices and ﬁnds that customers with trade-in
vehicles pay on average $600 more for their new car.




ABT -303.85 -464.34 -87.58 -0.0013
(16.44) (26.53) (19.93) (0.00076)
ABTFranchise -123.89 -129.37 18.26 0.0024
(5.54) (8.20) (6.08) (0.00030)
SameDealer 23.41 -40.47 -40.10
(30.36) (48.07) (36.51)
EndOfMonth -53.95 -77.04 -24.79
(5.99) (8.82) (6.57)
Weekend 79.02 85.90 -26.57
(5.23) (7.60) (5.68)
SouthernCal -103.56 -120.39 -67.62 0.0105
(5.23) (7.79) (5.80) (0.00028)
Month2 6.61 -7.21 -15.65 0.0020
(12.87) (18.89) (13.97) (0.00070)
Month3 -13.87 -9.67 -10.02 0.0041
(12.25) (18.01) (13.32) (0.00067)
Month4 -25.14 -6.12 -15.71 0.0049
(12.52) (18.40) (13.65) (0.00068)
Month5 -37.84 -21.12 -36.49 0.0054
(12.23) (17.98) (13.35) (0.00066)
Month6 -68.44 -47.08 -25.34 0.0075
(12.58) (18.49) (13.73) (0.00068)
Month7 -87.26 -85.23 -63.87 0.0050
(12.44) (18.25) (13.59) (0.00068)
Month8 -151.81 -156.88 -59.35 0.0052
(12.70) (18.74) (13.99) (0.00069)
Month9 -206.87 -226.77 -76.25 0.0039
(15.45) (22.73) (16.87) (0.00084)
Month10 -303.42 -301.48 -31.48 0.0074
(16.80) (24.80) (18.35) (0.00091)
Month11 -355.69 -324.72 -25.67 0.0068
(17.93) (26.47) (19.53) (0.00097)
Month12 -438.84 -461.76 -94.78 0.0078
(20.40) (30.11) (22.25) (0.00111)
Month13 -460.72 -488.96 -108.51 0.0093
(21.91) (32.08) (23.78) (0.00119)
Month14 -481.34 -547.41 -150.39 0.0111
(22.89) (33.64) (25.07) (0.00124)
ModelMonth5-13 -16.27 -11.77 -9.57 -0.0002
(12.50) (18.49) (13.68) (0.00068)
ModelMonth14+ -33.29 3.10 29.89 0.0016
(20.78) (30.45) (22.64) (0.00113)
Constant 1958.96 2486.44 541.77 9.9475
(12.92) (19.22) (64.42) (0.00069)
CarDummies ... ... ... ...
Observations 187810 140522 145962 187810
Adj./Pseudo R
2 0.436 0.360 0.0088 0.9677
*All reported coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level or better except SameDealer,
some months, and the model month dummies. Column 3: 70437 left-censored observations
at FinancingProﬁt<= 0, 75525 uncensored observations
23consumers who then avoid aftermarket options and insurance,or bargain harder for them,
then the use of the Internet by consumers is reducing dealer proﬁts. On the other hand,if
these customers would have obtained information from books and friends in the absence of the
Internet,there is no change in dealer proﬁts; this group would not have purchased aftermarket
options or insurance regardless of the Internet.
We present two analyses that begin to separate the selection eﬀect from the bargaining/lower-
cost eﬀect. Three-quarters of the customers in our sample obtain ﬁnancing from the dealer.
Sixty-four percent of ABT customers use dealer ﬁnancing and 76% of non-ABT customers do.
Autobytel.com and the Internet provide information and bargaining power that could help cus-
tomers get the best rate. The most ﬁnancially-savvy individuals will obtain ﬁnancing over the
web or from a non-dealer source. We restrict the sample to customers who obtained ﬁnancing
from the dealer in order to exclude these sophisticated buyers and weaken the selection eﬀect.
We run a tobit (censored regression) on dealer proﬁt from ﬁnancing,which is often zero. The
results are reported in column 3 of Table 7. ABT customers contribute about $88 less to
dealer proﬁt from ﬁnancing,although Autobytel.com franchises collect $18 more in ﬁnancing
proﬁt from an average customer than other dealers. These results suggest Autobytel.com helps
customers with information and bargaining clout.
Table 8 examines how price dispersion at the dealer level varies with the amount of Auto-
bytel.com business the dealership has. We use residuals from our baseline regression (no ABT
variables) to construct residuals. We create a dealer variance variable,which is simply the
variance of those error terms by dealer. We then regress this measure on the percentage of the
dealer’s sales that are to Autobytel.com customers and whether or not the dealership has a
contract with Autobytel.com. The second column in the table adds the dealership’s size,the
percentage of its customers who ﬁnance their cars,and the percentage of its Autobytel.com
customers who do not switch dealerships. We see in both speciﬁcations that the coeﬃcient on
Autobytel.com percentage is negative and signiﬁcant. Selling more cars through Autobytel.com
reduces price dispersion at the dealership level. This indicates that we are not simply seeing
the same customers and distribution of proﬁt levels ﬂowing through new channels. Instead,
the Internet is altering the shape of the proﬁt distribution. Dealerships that engage in more
ﬁnancing have higher levels of dispersion,but a contract with Autobytel.com is not related to
dispersion levels. We plan to investigate dispersion across and within dealerships more fully in
future research.

















* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level or better
6 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the eﬀect of Internet referral services on retail auto prices and dealer
proﬁts. We show that the Internet has changed the product market behavior of dealerships.
While the Internet performs the expected roles of reducing search costs and serving consumers’
information needs,it also is changing ﬁrm pricing behavior in an important sector of the
economy.
In this paper we capitalize on the fact that Internet purchase referral services do not control
the prices oﬀered by the dealer. This means that prices that are oﬀered to consumers continue
to be the choice variable of dealers,whether or not a consumer walked into the showroom or
was referred by an Internet service. We show that conditional on the dealer,consumers that
submitted a purchase request save about $379. Including the eﬀect of being sent to a low-price
dealer chosen by Autobytel.com the savings increase to $450. We also show that dealer gross
margins on the sale of a vehicle to a customer with an Internet purchase referral are signiﬁcantly
lower than gross margins earned selling the vehicle the traditional way. However,because online
customers are cheaper to serve,the dealer may nonetheless be better oﬀ working with Internet
purchase referral services. We also ﬁnd that proﬁts earned by the dealer on extra services
are lower for an online than oﬄine customer. We examine price dispersion at the dealership
level and ﬁnd that it declines in the amount of Autobytel.com business the dealership has,
indicating that the Internet referral service is altering the distribution of prices. We conclude
that consumers can gain from using the Internet to help purchase a new car and that the
Internet has changed the product market behavior of dealerships.
By altering the size and distribution of dealer proﬁts,the Internet has the potential to
25signiﬁcantly change the structure of the retail automobile industry. There are a number of
research avenues we intend to pursue that will help us understand these changes. We are
interested in the eﬀect of Internet sales on price dispersion within and across dealerships because
this could shed light on how rents are shifting between consumers and dealers and among dealers
themselves. We are exploring ways to decompose the online price decrease into the amount
due to the bargaining power of the Internet referral service and the amount due to the cost
savings inherent in being an online customer. We also plan to use the demographic information
in the dataset to examine whether race and gender discrimination is present and whether it is
aﬀected by using an Internet purchase referral service.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics for JDPASegment=Compact
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 34794 0.027 0.163 0 1
ABTFranchise 34794 0.278 0.448 0 1
SameDealer 34794 0.008 0.087 0 1
Price 34794 14716.3 2338.5 5946 26285
TotalPrice 34794 16929.8 2701.9 6856 29602
TradeInOverAllowance 8010 575.3 1307.6 -8000 9240
VehicleProﬁt 33210 1017.4 872.5 -2840 6388
TotalProﬁt 32964 1414.341 1130.24 -498 9622
VehicleCost 33210 14121.2 1535.7 7351 24734
DaysToTurn 33740 38.4 48.0 1 502
EndOfMonth 34794 0.213 0.409 0 1
Weekend 34794 0.359 0.480 0 1
Female 28030 0.465 0.499 0 1
AnyFinancing 34794 0.785 0.411 0 1
AmountFinanced 27319 14524.6 3325.0 691 27314
FinancingProﬁt 27057 253.6 467.0 0 6837
Table 10: Summary Statistics for JDPASegment=Luxury
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 16743 0.037 0.189 0 1
ABTFranchise 16743 0.441 0.496 0 1
SameDealer 16743 0.008 0.089 0 1
Price 16743 37718.1 13296.5 20706 106370
TotalPrice 16743 42206.3 15350.6 23900 118284
TradeInOverAllowance 3872 354.5 1566.2 -9500 16400
VehicleProﬁt 16224 2999.6 1724.0 -3247 13384
TotalProﬁt 16116 3404.241 2072.292 -1425 16853
VehicleCost 16224 34600.8 11893.1 20445 93584
DaysToTurn 16409 22.3 38.8 1 418
EndOfMonth 16743 0.227 0.419 0 1
Weekend 16743 0.274 0.446 0 1
Female 12949 0.330 0.470 0 1
AnyFinancing 16743 0.681 0.466 0 1
AmountFinanced 11408 35200.3 15337.6 3169 106431
FinancingProﬁt 11299 478.0 863.9 0 9053
28Table 11: Summary Statistics for JDPASegment=Midsize
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 45075 0.037 0.188 0 1
ABTFranchise 45075 0.330 0.470 0 1
SameDealer 45075 0.011 0.102 0 1
Price 45075 20825.6 3281.6 10938 36100
TotalPrice 45075 23497.1 3701.2 13266 45575
TradeInOverAllowance 12689 753.3 1734.7 -8000 11966
VehicleProﬁt 43569 1278.2 1048.4 -4894 7678
TotalProﬁt 43301 1629.955 1260.436 -820 10992
VehicleCost 43569 19875.0 2802.7 10917 36437
DaysToTurn 42942 41.0 52.8 1 606
EndOfMonth 45075 0.212 0.409 0 1
Weekend 45075 0.352 0.478 0 1
Female 36159 0.407 0.491 0 1
AnyFinancing 45075 0.742 0.438 0 1
AmountFinanced 33426 19790.3 4710.9 800 40045
FinancingProﬁt 33136 262.4 508.1 0 8633
Table 12: Summary Statistics for JDPASegment=Pickup
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 27064 0.008 0.087 0 1
ABTFranchise 27064 0.308 0.462 0 1
SameDealer 27064 0.003 0.052 0 1
Price 27064 21162.5 5523.4 7899 38171
TotalPrice 27064 24065.3 6225.7 8934 50031
TradeInOverAllowance 8705 942.1 1780.5 -9250 15242
VehicleProﬁt 26006 1678.7 1174.8 -3447 8639
TotalProﬁt 25264 2174.636 1492.184 -743 13662
VehicleCost 26006 19979.0 4665.0 9231 35038
DaysToTurn 25968 42.0 51.5 1 498
EndOfMonth 27064 0.203 0.402 0 1
Weekend 27064 0.304 0.460 0 1
Female 23709 0.189 0.391 0 1
AnyFinancing 27064 0.793 0.405 0 1
AmountFinanced 21474 20569.5 6063.7 653 46913
FinancingProﬁt 20690 318.0 597.4 0 9404
29Table 13: Summary Statistics for JDPASegment=SUV
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 44482 0.035 0.183 0 1
ABTFranchise 44482 0.352 0.478 0 1
SameDealer 44482 0.012 0.107 0 1
Price 44482 29442.1 6178.4 12602 58630
TotalPrice 44482 32923.5 6919.4 13045 73652
TradeInOverAllowance 14545 858.4 2038.1 -9980 18500
VehicleProﬁt 43127 1960.6 1391.1 -4584 10350
TotalProﬁt 42236 2417.126 1658.917 -1151 14553
VehicleCost 43127 27773.5 5671.6 11547 55184
DaysToTurn 43037 39.7 53.3 1 501
EndOfMonth 44482 0.209 0.407 0 1
Weekend 44482 0.313 0.464 0 1
Female 37696 0.303 0.460 0 1
AnyFinancing 44482 0.772 0.419 0 1
AmountFinanced 34353 27900.5 7290.4 500 57500
FinancingProﬁt 33414 365.7 669.9 0 9758
Table 14: Summary Statistics for JDPASegment=Sporty
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 8485 0.031 0.173 0 1
ABTFranchise 8485 0.326 0.469 0 1
SameDealer 8485 0.009 0.092 0 1
Price 8485 24044.1 9439.8 11538 61386
TotalPrice 8485 27179.8 10370.1 13665 69688
TradeInOverAllowance 2398 755.4 1638.3 -8200 11737
VehicleProﬁt 8203 1907.4 1792.2 -3827 10976
TotalProﬁt 8092 2335.819 2064.818 -704 14941
VehicleCost 8203 22622.9 7963.8 11492 54901
DaysToTurn 8234 54.4 69.8 1 642
EndOfMonth 8485 0.204 0.403 0 1
Weekend 8485 0.329 0.470 0 1
Female 7304 0.374 0.484 0 1
AnyFinancing 8485 0.813 0.390 0 1
AmountFinanced 6900 22341.1 8256.3 3075 58017
FinancingProﬁt 6785 301.7 632.1 0 8910
30Table 15: Summary Statistics for JDPASegment=Van
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ABT 19129 0.049 0.217 0 1
ABTFranchise 19129 0.313 0.464 0 1
SameDealer 19129 0.011 0.105 0 1
Price 19129 23404.6 3977.9 8139 36009
TotalPrice 19129 26584.0 4363.1 13904 46376
TradeInOverAllowance 5955 869.7 1887.9 -9500 12700
VehicleProﬁt 17471 2025.2 1591.3 -3124 8485
TotalProﬁt 17251 2474.438 1696.696 -1194 14659
VehicleCost 17471 22256.1 2446.9 9908 32676
DaysToTurn 18428 46.9 60.8 1 524
EndOfMonth 19129 0.211 0.408 0 1
Weekend 19129 0.324 0.468 0 1
Female 15549 0.271 0.444 0 1
AnyFinancing 19129 0.723 0.447 0 1
AmountFinanced 13833 22380.8 5242.3 1500 40560
FinancingProﬁt 13581 274.8 550.9 0 7750
Table 16: Transaction summary statistics by Autobytel.com franchise
ABTFranchise=0 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price 131068 23076.8 8255.8 5946 106370
TotalPrice 131068 26017.5 9135.3 6856 118284
TradeInOverAllowance 38564 743.6 1754.7 -9980 18500
VehicleProﬁt 125916 1678.7 1335.1 -4894 12795
TotalProﬁt 93567 2180.0 1583.6 -1425 16569
VehicleCost 125916 21785.7 7307.8 7351 93584
DaysToTurn 125129 41.5 54.9 1 642
EndOfMonth 131068 0.208 0.406 0 1
Weekend 131068 0.324 0.468 0 1
Female 108624 0.339 0.473 0 1
AnyFinancing 131068 0.751 0.432 0 1
AmountFinanced 98476 21895.7 8507.2 691 106431
FinancingProﬁt 96985 307.4 580.3 0 9758
ABTFranchise=1 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price 64704 24600.5 9863.9 7499 101370
TotalPrice 64704 27814.9 11059.9 8463 115408
TradeInOverAllowance 17610 825.7 1839.9 -9250 16489
VehicleProﬁt 61894 1712.7 1517.8 -3929 13384
TotalProﬁt 46955 2254.9 1837.0 -1137 16853
VehicleCost 61894 23344.4 8837.3 9139 93234
DaysToTurn 63629 36.7 48.7 1 502
EndOfMonth 64704 0.218 0.413 0 1
Weekend 64704 0.335 0.472 0 1
Female 52772 0.342 0.474 0 1
AnyFinancing 64704 0.776 0.417 0 1
AmountFinanced 50237 23241.8 9884.3 500 104430
FinancingProﬁt 48977 321.1 639.6 0 9697
31Table 17: Demographics by Autobytel.com franchise
ABTFranchise=0 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 108,624 0.339 0.473 0 1
%Professional 129,081 16.3 8.8 0 100
%Farmer 129,081 2.8 6.2 0 100
MedianHHIncome 128,576 57,563.7 25,288.3 10,500 150,000
MedianAgeHeadHH 128,576 45.2 6.8 13 70
%CollegeGrad 128,643 31.1 17.3 0 100
%<HighSchool 128,643 13.2 12.5 0 100
%Black 128,647 4.3 9.7 0 100
ABTFranchise=1 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 52,772 0.342 0.474 0 1
%Professional 63,662 16.8 9.0 0 100
%Farmer 63,662 2.0 4.6 0 100
MedianHHIncome 63,409 60,754.1 26,122.6 10,500 150,000
MedianAgeHeadHH 63,409 45.2 6.7 13 70
%CollegeGrad 63,450 33.2 17.6 0 100
%<HighSchool 63,450 12.8 12.6 0 100
%Black 63,453 4.6 10.4 0 100
32Table 18: Regressions by JDPA Segment
JDPA Segment Compact Luxury Midsize Pickup SUV Sporty Van
ABT -0.0236 -0.0048 -0.0213 -0.0405 -0.0121 -0.0235 -0.0071
(0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0077) (0.0023) (0.0059) (0.0034)
ABTFranchise -0.0031 -0.0020 -0.0046 -0.0085 -0.0043 -0.0061 -0.0030
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0014)
SameDealer 0.0099 -0.0056 0.0019 0.0147 0.0023 0.0127 -0.0020
(0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0130) (0.0040) (0.0111) (0.0069)
EndOfMonth -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0040 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0031 -0.0034
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0016)
Weekend -0.0032 0.0005 -0.0037 0.0026 -0.0019 -0.0057 -0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0014)
SouthernCal 0.0163 -0.0056 0.0112 0.0104 0.0040 -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Month2 0.0076 -0.0023 0.0003 0.0054 0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0060
(0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0048) (0.0034)
Month3 0.0037 0.0015 -0.0026 0.0052 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0084
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0045) (0.0032)
Month4 -0.0030 0.0039 -0.0021 0.0022 0.0012 0.0020 -0.0051
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0046) (0.0034)
Month5 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0097 0.0024 0.0012 -0.0046 -0.0105
(0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0044) (0.0032)
Month6 0.0010 -0.0067 -0.0039 0.0037 -0.0003 -0.0047 -0.0016
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0045) (0.0033)
Month7 -0.0015 -0.0053 -0.0114 -0.0048 -0.0087 -0.0098 0.0029
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0044) (0.0034)
Month8 0.0020 -0.0122 -0.0169 -0.0115 -0.0152 -0.0060 0.0005
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0048) (0.0036)
Month9 0.0031 -0.0161 -0.0238 -0.0167 -0.0229 -0.0091 0.0062
(0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0053) (0.0046)
Month10 -0.0006 -0.0107 -0.0253 -0.0239 -0.0244 -0.0155 0.0128
(0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0022) (0.0062) (0.0050)
Month11 -0.0078 -0.0130 -0.0303 -0.0281 -0.0296 -0.0203 0.0023
(0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0066) (0.0053)
Month12 -0.0112 -0.0157 -0.0380 -0.0355 -0.0303 -0.0212 -0.0075
(0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0076) (0.0056)
Month13 -0.0113 -0.0143 -0.0385 -0.0356 -0.0289 -0.0310 0.0115
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0079) (0.0062)
Month14 -0.0207 -0.0127 -0.0396 -0.0395 -0.0257 -0.0414 0.0127
(0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0082) (0.0064)
ModelMonth5-13 -0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0021 0.0087 0.0000 0.0121 -0.0063
(0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0045) (0.0033)
ModelMonth14+ -0.0113 -0.0302 0.0023 0.0101 -0.0066 0.0018 -0.0277
(0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0073) (0.0062)
Constant 9.5808 10.5074 9.9472 9.9209 10.2800 10.0320 10.0535
(0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0049) (0.0034)
Car dummies ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Observations 34794 16743 45075 27064 44482 8485 19129
Adjusted R
2 0.76 0.97 0.75 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.78
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